**1nc triples**

**offcase**

**t**

**The role of the ballot is to determine the desirability of topical action –**

**The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action.**

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, shouldadopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

**Federal government refers to the central government – not the aff**

**AHD 92** (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, p. 647)

federal—3. Of or relating to the **central government** of a federation as distinct from the governments of **its member units**.

**Vote neg for two reasons:**

**First - predictable limits---allowing the aff to pick any grounds for debate makes engagement impossible by skirting a predictable starting point and undermining preparation and research. Radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead: they have incentives to cement their infinite prep by selecting the most one-sided ideas and can choose only orientations toward the word, not praxis with an actor or mechanism. Fairness is an intrinsic good, vital to the practice of debate, and logically prior to deciding any other argument.**

**Second- ground:**

**A well-defined resolution is critical to allow an iterative process of argument testing and improvement---this does not require particular forms of argument, but does require a common point of disagreement.**

**Poscher ‘16**

Director at the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg (Ralf, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing, forthcoming. Modified for language that may offend)

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104

This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”.

These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea.

In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the (perspective) ~~view~~ towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case.

It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena.

f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives

It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?

One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above.

2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS

The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it must still come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes.

In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same term. The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements.

A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire one‐right‐answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached.

The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaning‐providing intentions often encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts – or the markets for that matter – qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speaker’s intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics.

In the case of the law, the meaning‐providing intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 – be it only in a historical perspective120. The fulcrum of disagreement that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 does not lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort – if only on the basis of an overlapping common ground of legal materials, accepted practices, experiences and dispositions. As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the same rules, share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context, but follow very different styles of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. They are in the same contest, even if there is no single best style in which to wrestle, box or swim. Each, however, is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince a bench of judges.122 Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept, in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal materials and practices. Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are ~~talking about~~ (discussing) the same concept. An agonistic account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic framework, which can explain in what sense lawyers, judges and scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past each other. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same legal materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, semantic unity is provided by the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their disagreement. Such a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials. To use an example of Michael Moore’s: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was “just”, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy.

**frames**

**First – our links:**

**1ac Morgan and Shahjahan casually deploys the term “fetish” as a description of current obsession with competition. This use—to describe an irrational obsession with a material object—replicates the long history of racist representation of African religions rooted in colonialism**

**Brown 3** – Karen McCarthy Brown, Professor of Anthropology of Religion at Drew University, “Making Wanga: Reality Constructions and the Magical Manipulation of Power”, in Transparency and Conspiracy, Ed. West and Sanders, p. 249

More than four hundred years ago, Europeans chose the **term *fetish*** to stand for powerful material objects used in traditional African religious set­tings. Chief among these objects were charms related to what would later become Vodou wanga. Not long after, the term fetishism or fetish religion began to be routinely applied to all aspects of all indigenous African reli­gions. To this day, the Vodun (Fon spirits or deities found in the Republic of Benin, formerly Dahomey) are called *fetiches* and their priests feticheurs, an­other instance of a colonized people **swallowing colonial rhetoric**. Diviners throughout Benin are routinely called charlatans, yet another remnant of the French presence in the former Dahomey. According to William Pietz, who has written an important series of articles on the history of the concept of fetishism, "the fetish, as an idea and a problem, and as a novel object not proper to any prior discrete society, originated in the cross-cultural spaces of the coast of West Africa during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (Pietz 1985: 5). Fetish theory, Pietz says, "was fully established in European intellectual discourse by 1800" (1987: 23). The term fetish subsequently became an **unusually influential** one in a wide range of intellectual, political, and economic interactions between Europe and Africa. For a remarkably long period of time, fetish theory has provided the **most pervasive and broadly influential rationale** for racism, colonialism, and general Western cultural chauvinism. Newton and Locke, figures of the seventeenth and early eighteenth cen­turies, both had in their libraries copies of the book that introduced "fetish religion" to the European world, Wilem Bosman's 1702 A New and Accu­rate Account of the Coast of Guinea (Pietz 1988). According to the theory of fetishism, "consecrated at the end of the eighteenth century by no less than G. W. F. Hegel in The Philosophy of History, Africans were incapable of **abstract and generalizing thought**; instead their ideas and actions were governed by **impulse**," and, as a consequence, it was commonly assumed that "anything upon which an African's eye happened to fall might be taken up by him and made into a 'fetish,' absurdly endowed with imaginary powers" (MacGaffey 1993: 32). In the nineteenth century, the concept of fetishism be­came **theoretically indispensable** to three of the founders of social science: Comte, Marx, and Freud. It is my purpose here to demonstrate that this intellectual arrangement has, from the beginning, been **devastating for black people** and that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the **fetish trope** still covertly and overtly shapes the images that Euro-Americans hold of Afri­cans and African Americans in cosmopolitan New York City.

**We can defend the rest of their advocacy and negate only certain parts. 2NR consolidation is the best alt:**

**One – no plan means any part of the 1AC can become the nexus question by the 2AR, we should reciprocally get to conditionally critique their frames and narrow the debate to parts of disagreement by the 2NR.**

**Two – – Praxis: our model teaches a form of engagement that corrects flaws in political strategies. Rejecting our approach is normatively worse for the Aff’s own cause.**

**Williams 15** Douglas Williams is a third-generation organizer, He earned his BA in Political Science at the University of Minnesota at Morris and his MPA at the University of Missouri Columbia, where he was also a Thurgood Marshall Fellow and a Stanley Botner Fellow. He is currently a doctoral student in political science at Wayne State University in Detroit, where his research centers around public policy as it relates to disadvantaged communities and the labor movement. From the article: “The Dead End of Identity Politics” - From: The South Lawn - March 10, 2015 – Internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer, Purdue University. DeBoer holds a PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue and an MA in English, concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, Modified for potentially objectionable language. In one instance a capital “B” was adjusted to a lower case “b” in a manner that boosted readability, but did not alter context. https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/

Freddie **DeBoer** makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: **many in the** broad online **left** have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. B(b)ut critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms (hampers) the left. **Refusing** to say ‘***this*** is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making ***that*** accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.” ----- (Williams is now no longer quoting DeBoer) Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness **and there will be no need for coalitions**, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

**Three – contingent agreement is good: negating the whole aff makes only the most extreme stances strategic, like prejudice is good. We should debate framing strategies rather than impact turns to injustice**

**Four – its fair: frame subtraction auto gives the aff ground – just defend the stances of the 1AC. There are net benefits to this Alt other than just the Condit cards. It applies to other frames that we’ve critiqued.**

**case**

**1nc – presumption/solvency**

**The 1AC is heavy on diagnosis and light on remedy. There’s a diagnosis of market violence, but little discussion of how the Aff interacts with those structures. Their speech act alone does not alter macro-structure that undergird violence.**

**Sure, the 1AC critiques Topicality – but that alone isn’t a reason to affirm. Vote neg on presumption - K Affs still have solvency burdens.**

**1nc – decon**

**Deconstruction undermines any action and creates a political void that increases oppression**

**Cook 92** – Anthony E. Cook, Associate Professor, Georgetown Law School; A.B., Princeton University, 1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1986, “A DIVERSITY OF INFLUENCE: Reflections on Postmodernism”, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 751, Lexis

2. Jacques Derrida

Derrida, like Foucault, was also influenced by the May, 1968 protests. In his first dated text of May of that year, a speech delivered at an international conference of philosophy in America, Derrida reminded his audience of the Vietnam War, the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the forceful invasions by the police of the Sorbonne in Paris. Before expounding on his topic, he carefully examined the [\*760] framework or presuppositions of language and culture that made his communication to philosophers possible, that is, the presuppositions that made it possible to say that his words had some specific and fixed meaning for those who heard them. 17Link to the text of the note

Derrida did not become a Ph.D candidate until 1980. The protests of 1968 so profoundly affected his conception of writing that the "thesis . . . could not survive the shake-up that May 1968 had forced the authorizing institution to face." 18Link to the text of the note To write and defend a thesis in 1968 was to defer to the very framework of authority that needed to be questioned and challenged. Thesis inquisitors would question the substance of the thesis, while Derrida contested the very form of the thesis itself and its role in constituting and reproducing oppressive power relations.

This intense period of protest made him realize that the stakes of what he was defending in his thesis, what the world now knows as deconstruction, were "not primarily a matter of philosophical contents, themes or theses, philosophemes, poems, theologemes or ideologemes, but especially and inseparably meaningful frames, institutional structures, pedagogical or rhetorical norms, the possibility of law, of authority, of evaluation, and of representation in terms of its very market." 19Link to the text of the note

At one level, Derrida's project of deconstruction throws even Foucault's insular politics into question. Deconstruction's perennial undermining of fixed representations raises the fundamental question of **how we can talk about anything**, be it the organizing theory of a structural philosophy or the particular constellation of power relations of a Foucaultian post-structuralism. That is, to invoke some sense of power relations or transformed social relations assumes a **fixed conception of reality** that Postmodern Deconstruction stands ready to destabilize. On one reading of postmodernism, the very possibility of communication is threatened by the postmodern critique. Communication is always conducted against the backdrop of presuppositions that make communication possible, that provide words their meaning. These presuppositions are not analytically necessary in any way. They can be replaced by other presuppositions that give different meaning to the words employed in communication.

David Harvey points out in his important contribution, The Condition of Postmodernity, that "to accept the fragmentation, the pluralism, and the authenticity of other voices and other worlds poses the acute problem of communication and the means of exercising power through command thereof." 20Link to the text of the note Deconstruction is a way of thinking about and [\*761] reading texts, texts defined both as written and oral communication. Cultural life for Derrida is a series of texts that are shaped and reshaped through the process of communication and comprehension.

For example, after this session, a group of you might assemble to discuss dimensions of this talk. Suppose an interpretive question arose in which one person contended that certain utterances of mine had one meaning while another contended that the same set of utterances had an altogether different meaning. A third person in the group might reasonably say well there he is, let's ask him what he meant and settle the issue. Derrida would contend that even if I thought I knew exactly what I meant when I uttered the words, not at all likely I assure you, this would not settle the issue. Indeed, the issue is incapable of being settled in any truly objective and determinate sense. Meaning is only objective in the sense that a group of people share the presuppositions of the communication. If the presupposition or frame is attacked, objective meaning disappears. Otherwise, every perceived settlement is an illusion ripe for deconstruction. Each of the interlocutors, notwithstanding my interpretation, would nevertheless be free to adopt their respective interpretations. No one, including the author of the utterance, has a lock on meaning.

This is so because my understanding of the words in question is based on all the other words and texts I have encountered. Similarly, when you hear my words or read them, your understanding of them is based on all the other words and texts you have encountered. Thus, whatever I write or say conveys meanings I do not or could not possibly intend. If this is so, who am I as author of my words, to privilege my interpretation of those words, which are a kind of community property and take on a life of their own, over your interpretation of those same words. We are working from different presuppositions or frames that make our understandings of those words incommensurate.

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that **any attempt to say what should be done** within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might **continue ad infinitum**. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, **political action is impossible**, because such action **requires a degree of closure** that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does **not** permit.

Moreover, the approach is debilitating because **deconstruction without material rootedness**, without goals and vision, **creates a political and spiritual void into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and steps on the disempowered and dispossessed**. [\*762] To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, ~~crippled~~ by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power **hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging**. When vision, social theory and **political struggle** do not accompany critique, the **void will be filled by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic**, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

**It trades-off with energy and tools needed to change the material world---it’s politically useless**

**Wolin 4** (Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurtry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The Seduction of Unreason : The Intellectual Romance With Fascism: from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, p. 229-230)

Deconstruction and the "Political" The question of deconstruction's relationship to contemporary politics has always been somewhat of a sore point. Most are by now familiar with the criticisms leveled against it for its deficiencies in this regard. These critiques have mostly centered on the issue of deconstruction's inordinate focus on questions of textuality and reading-an issue best dramatized perhaps by Derrida's oft-cited, controversial maxim, "There is nothing outside the text"-"il n'y a pas de hOTS texte."24 Deconstruction's detractors have alleged that this well-nigh exclusive preoccupation with semiotic themes, with the figuration and involutions of texts, has functioned **at the expense of** more worldly and practical concerns. The world might be crumbling all around us, they charge, but Derrida seems more interested in the contingencies of this or that phoneme-the amusing fact that in French Hegel's name is the phonic equivalent of "eagle" (aigle"). As those familiar with Derrida's work know, in Glas (dirge") this chance homonymic equivalence gave rise to a rumination of some three hundred pages on analogous linguistic slippages and fissures. 25 One of the first to raise such charges of practical-political irrelevance against Derrida's negative semiotics of reading was Michel Foucault. In his response to Derrida's unsparing critique of Madness 230 CHAPTER SIX and Civilization, Foucault pilloried deconstruction as nothing more than an idiosyncratic variant of the classical method of "explication de terte." As Foucault observes with palpable condescension, deconstruction practices an "historically determined little pedagogy" characterized by "the reduction of discursive practices [which for Foucault, of course, are sources of "power"-R.W] to textual traces: the elision of the events produced therein and the retention only of marks for a reading; the invention of voices behind texts to avoid having to analyze the modes of implication of the subject in discourses; the assigning of the originary as said and unsaid in the text to avoid replacing discursive practices in the field of transformations where they are carried out." Thus, according to Foucault, Derrida offers us little more than an interpretive practice that "teaches the pupil that there is nothing outside the text" and "which conversely gives to the master's voice the limitless sovereignty which allows it to restate the text indefinitely."26 As the progenitor of deconstruction, Derrida is the master ventriloquist who in sovereign fashion determines which textual meanings become unraveled and how. Foucault's major fear is that, in the hands of deconstruction, the critique of power and domination, one of the key outcomes of May'68, would be supplanted by an exclusive orientation toward **politically pointless** textual analysis. Nor is Foucault the only critic to have challenged Derrida in this way. Edward Said has contended that Derrida's higWy formalized obsession with the abstruse terms of "archewriting"-that is, with "nonconcepts" such as the trace, grammatology, supplement, differance, dissemination, and so forth-ends up by "muddling ... thought beyond the possibility of usefulness." Said continues, The effect of [deconstructionist] logic (the misee» abime) is to reduce everything that we think of as having some extra textual leverage in the text to a textual function.... Derrida's key words ... are unregenerate signs: he says that they cannot be made more significant than signifiers are. In some quite urgent way, then, there is something frivolous about them, as all words that cannot be accommodated to a philosophy of serious need or utility are futile or unserious.27

**1nc – engagement**

**The impact is privatization and a collapse into pure ethics**

**McNay 09** (Lois, Lecturer in Politics and Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford, “Self as Enterprise: Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in Foucault's The Birth of Biopolitics,” Theory Culture Society, 26:55. P. 67-68)

A possible objection is that **it would be incorrect to interpret Foucault’s idea of an ethics of the self as offering an account of oppositional political agency**. Certainly, Foucault repeatedly states that the idea is not intended to provide a blueprint for political action. **It merely outlines a set of ethical predispositions that provide a crucial precondition for democratic practices but have no particular entailments for an account of political action.** Such a strict demarcation of the ethical from the political seems untenable, however, in the light of the connections Foucault establishes between a critical ontology of the self and emancipation. On any reading of Foucault’s descriptions of an ethics of the self, it is clear that **he did not envisage it as a solipsistic exercise but rather as a multifaceted form of ‘practical critique’ whose subversive effects are felt in many domains of social practice:** ‘the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is . . . to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state’ (Foucault, 1982: 216). He frequently describes the idea of an ethics of the self in the politicized terms of a ‘liberation’, a ‘struggle’, a ‘refusal’ and, on several occasions, explicitly compares its methods and aims with political movements such as feminism (Foucault, 1984b: 46–7).6 Given this, **it is difficult to see how a critical social ontology oriented to the ‘intransigence of freedom’ can be anything other than a fully political project. On this politicized reading of ethics of the self, it becomes reasonable to ask to what extent it represents a plausible basis for an oppositional political agency,** especially in the light of Foucault’s powerful analysis of the disciplinary restructuring of self as enterprise. If the later work is read through the problematic of the earlier lectures, **there seems to be a fundamental mismatch between the analytics of biopower and the idea of ethical self-formation**. To put it bluntly, how can an individualized process of ethical self-formation have sufficient resources to present a serious challenge to, or refusal of, a form of power that operates precisely through the proliferation of difference and the management of individual autonomy**?** **Foucault’s desire to locate political opposition at the level of an individual practice stems**, famously, **from his** well-documented **antipathy to Marxist and other collective plans for political action**. But 25 years on, **with** the fragmenting effects of **neoliberal governance deeply entrenched** within the fabric of many Western democracies, it is questionable whether an ethics of self can withstand co-optation into the flexible, depoliticizing spirit of capitalism**.** **As Myers puts it**: ‘although Foucault labels the activity of self-constitution a “practice of freedom” . . . **techniques of self-care are inadequate instruments for confronting the specifically depoliticizing effects of discipline and biopower, which concern the configuration of plurality’** (2008: 135). As a model of political action, **an individual ethics of the self appears to be relatively ineffective because its** **radical energies seem too vulnerable to reprivatization by the assimilating force of the self as enterprise**. Against this, it is possible to argue that ethics of the self is not only intended to be an individualized self-relation but may also denote a widespread ethos of openness to alterity intended to ground collective democratic practices.7 Even on this reading, however, **the** same **explanatory gaps remain as to how a generalized structure of feeling has sufficient force to amount to a ‘refusal’ of a pervasive and depoliticizing form of social organization**. **Missing is any indication of how a** relatively **loose and indeterminate ethos located in everyday life can be mediated into more durable and directed practices so as to constitute part of a concerted ‘struggle’ against neoliberal governance**. Indeed, against the claim that it is too demanding to interpret ethics of the self as an account of political agency, it is possible to counter that **Foucault problematically collapses politics back to ethics in so far as the contestatory force attributed to practices of self-formation is asserted rather than justified.** In short, **there is a troubling political quietism in the idea of ethics of the self which considerably weakens its counter-hegemonic potential vis-à-vis the disruption of neoliberal governance of the self.**

**1nc – gs**

**The Aff uses the phrase “Global South” several times – it’s unnecessary and violently homogenizing.**

**Toshkov 18** Dimiter Toshkov - Associate Professor at the Institute of Public Administration at Leiden University in The Netherlands. Formerly, Jean Monnet fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence - “The ‘Global South’ is a terrible term. Don’t use it!” - November 6, 2018 - #E&F - http://re-design.dimiter.eu/?p=969

The ‘Global South‘ and ‘Global North‘ are increasingly popular terms used to categorize the countries of the world. According to Wikipedia, the term ‘Global South’ originated in postcolonial studies, and was first used in 1969. The Google N-gram chart below shows the rise of the ‘Global South’ term from 1980 till 2008, but the rise is even more impressive afterwards.

**There is no Global South**

The Global South/Global North terms are inaccurate and misleading. First, they are descriptively inaccurate, **even when they refer to general notions such as (economic) development**. Second, they are homogenizing, obscuring important differences between countries supposedly part of the Global South and North groups. In this respect, these terms are no better than alternatives that they are trying to replace, such as ‘the West‘ or the ‘Third World‘. Third, the Global South/Global North terms imply a **geographic determinism** that is wrong and demotivational. Poor countries are not doomed to be poor, because they happen to be in the South, and their geographic position is not a verdict on their developmental prospects.

The Global South/Global North terms are inaccurate and misleading

Let me show you just how bad these terms are. I focus on human development, broadly defined and measured by the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI tracks life expectancy, education, and standard of living, so it captures more than purely economic aspects of development.

The chart below plots the geographic latitude of a country’ capital against the country’s HDI score for 2017. (Click on the image for a larger size or download a higher resolution pdf). It is quite clear that a straight line from South to North is a poor description of the relationship between geographic latitude and human development. The correlation between the two is 0.48. A linear regression of HDI on latitude returns a positive coefficient, and the R-squared as 0.23. But, as is obvious from the plot, the relationship is not linear. In fact, some of the southern-most countries on the planet, such as Australia and New Zealand, but also Chile and Argentina, are in the top ranks of human development. The best summary of the relationship between HDI and latitude is curvilinear, as indicated by the Loess (nonparametric local regression) fit.

**Here's our Alt, discursive impact, and int link to essentialism.**

**Toshkov 18** Dimiter Toshkov - Associate Professor at the Institute of Public Administration at Leiden University in The Netherlands. Formerly, Jean Monnet fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence - “The ‘Global South’ is a terrible term. Don’t use it!” - November 6, 2018 - #E&F - http://re-design.dimiter.eu/?p=969

**What to use instead?**

OK, so the Global South/Global North are bad words, but what to use instead? There is no obvious substitute that is more descriptively accurate, less homogenizing and less suggestive of (geographic) determinism. But then don’t use any categorization that is so general and coarse. There is a good reason why there is no appropriate alternative term: the countries of the world are too diverse to fit into two boxes: one for South and one for North, one for developed and one for non-developed, one for powerful, and one for oppressed.

Be specific about what the term is referring to, and be concrete about the set of countries that is covered. If you mean the 20 poorest countries in the world, say the 20 poor countries in the world, not countries of the Global South. If you mean technologically underdeveloped countries, say that and not countries of the Third World. If you mean rich, former colonial powers from Western Europe, say that and not the Global North. It takes a few more words, but it is more accurate and less misleading.

It is a bit ironic that the Global South/Global North terms are most popular among scholars and activists who are extremely sensitive about the power of words to **shape public discourses,** **homogenize diverse populations**, and support narratives that take a life of their own, influencing politics and public policy. If that’s the case, it makes it even more imperative to avoid terms that are inaccurate, homogenizing and misleading on a global scale.

**1nc – neolib**

**Deconstructing “neolib” isn’t emancipatory and deepens ideological polarization**

**Venugopal 15** – Rajesh Venugopal, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics [“Neoliberalism As Concept,” Economy and Society, Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 165-187]

Beyond conceptual proliferation and incoherence, there is an important third terminological feature of neoliberalism that more clearly distinguishes it from the multitude of other stressed and stretched concepts that dot the social sciences: it dares not speak its own name. While there are many who give out and are given the title of neoliberal, there are none who will embrace this moniker of power and call themselves as such. There is no contemporary body of knowledge that calls itself neoliberalism, no self-described neoliberal theorists that elaborate it, nor policy-makers or practitioners that implement it. There are no primers or advanced textbooks on the subject matter, no pedagogues, courses or students of neoliberalism, no policies or election manifestoes that promise to implement it (although there are many that promise to dismantle it). Pedantic as it may seem, this is a point that warrants repetition if only because there is a considerable body of critical literature that deploys neoliberalism under the **mistaken assumption** that, in doing so, it is being transported into the **front-lines of hand-to-hand combat** with free-market economics. Advocates of market deregulation, private-sector-led growth or any of the various shifting components that might be part of neoliberalism do not describe themselves or their policies as such. Instead, neoliberalism is defined, conceptualized and deployed exclusively by those who stand in evident opposition to it, such that the act of using the word has the twofold effect of identifying oneself as non-neoliberal, and of passing negative moral judgment over it. Consequently, neoliberalism often features, even in sober academic tracts, in the rhetorical toolkit of **caricature and dismissal**, rather than of analysis and deliberation. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009, p. 152) find that the inversion in its usage from positive to negative arose during the Pinochet regime in Chile. Until then, Latin American debates over economic policy in the 1960s and 1970s used the term largely in the positive sense, often with reference to West Germany's Wirtschaftswunder, whereas it became steadily negative in the 1980s. Importantly, neoliberalism, which was always a marginal part of the vocabulary in mainstream academic economics, even before its negative association, has since disappeared almost entirely in that arena in parallel with its growing influence and usage in the rest of the social sciences. As a result, the one-sided usage of neoliberalism extends not just to the way it is used only by self-consciously non-neoliberal critics, but also as a term **used only by non-economists**, and that, too, when referring to economic phenomena and economic forms of reasoning. Indeed, the word neoliberalism is so utterly absent in modern economics that it is impossible to reconcile Ferguson's above definition of it as ‘macro-economic doctrine’ with the corpus of contemporary macro-economic theory at hand. For example, the word neoliberalism does not appear at all in any of the major macro-economic textbooks, including Mankiw's Principles of macroeconomics (2012), Blanchard's Macroeconomics (2012), Obstfeld and Rogoff's Foundations of international macroeconomics (1996), Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz's International economics or Agénor and Montiel's Development macroeconomics (2008). Neither does it appear at all in a host of other widely read texts in the field, including Debraj Ray's Development economics (1998), Banerjee and Duflo's Poor economics (2011) or Barr's The economics of the welfare state (1993). Even the more unorthodox economists critical of market-based solutions, such as Paul Krugman or Joseph Stiglitz, find no need to use the concept. Neoliberalism is absent entirely from Krugman's End this depression now! and finds mention only once (in a footnote to the preface) in Stiglitz's The price of inequality: The avoidable causes and the invisible costs of inequality (2012). Moreover, neoliberalism has, since 1966, only ever appeared twice in the pages of The American Economic Review, on both occasions as fleeting mentions. It has not appeared at all in The Quarterly Journal of Economics since 1960, nor in Journal of Political Economy since 1956. It has never appeared in Journal of Development Economics at all. In comparison, in 2012, it appeared in 10 papers in The Journal of Development Studies, eight papers in World Development, 17 papers in Development and Change and 10 papers in Journal of International Development. 5 What these strikingly different patterns of usage between economics and non-economics indicate is that, beyond dysfunctionality, neoliberalism signifies and reproduces the **mutual incomprehensibility** and the **deep cognitive divide** between these two domains (Jackson, 2013; Milonakis & Fine, 2013). Ha-Joon Chang notes that ‘critics of neoliberalism are routinely dismissed as **“economically illiterate”**’ (Chang, 2003, pp. 42–43). Indeed, for the rest of the social sciences, economics is an entirely alien discipline that is found to be intellectually vapid on the one hand, but also inscrutable and impenetrable due to the mathematical sophistication of its theory and empirics. Neoliberalism purports to provide a **lens** through which this mysterious and hostile terrain can be surveyed, simplified, labelled and rendered understandable from a safe distance. Economic theory can thus be vicariously critiqued and dismissed without one having to encounter it, much less understand it. Not unsurprisingly, what emerges as a result is **inadequate** and often bears the character of dispatches from trench warfare, in which sketchy and vague outlines of enemy activity are reported from across a foggy and impassable no-man's land. For example, David Harvey's history of neoliberalism, a standard and widely quoted primer on the subject, makes frequent references to and locks horns with a body of knowledge it calls neoliberal theory. Leaving aside the shifting amalgam of idiosyncratic postulates that Harvey describes as constitutive of and flowing from it, the book contains no reference to any contemporary academic work of what it considers to be neoliberal theory. 6 This is of course not surprising because there is for all practical purposes no such thing: it is an artifice willed into existence not by its theorists but by its critics and can as such be cut to shape to fit whichever conceptual variant serves their purpose.

**1nc – university**

**Their K doesn’t link to us---the university isn’t monolithic. BUT we have offense---it locks in the status quo they’ve K’d.**

**Tolson** – internally quoting Wellmon – **15** This card is an excerpt from Chad Wellmon’s new book. Wellmon is a faculty fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia. Wellmon’s book is titled: Organizing Enlightenment: Information Overload and the Invention of the Modern Research University - Jay Tolson is Editor of The Hedgehog Review, a publication of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia. A journalist, editor, author, and critic, Tolson covered religion, culture and ideas for U. S. News & World Report after working for more than decade as the literary editor and editor of the Wilson Quarterly – Article Title: “Media Excess, Disruption, and the Future of the University” – HEDGEHOG REVIEW: Critical Reflections on Contemporary Culture - March 11th – ellipses in original – modified for potentially objectionable language - Available at: http://iasc-culture.org/THR/channels/THR/author/jtolson/

In his new book, Organizing Enlightenment: Information Overload and the Invention of the Modern Research University, literary historian Chad Wellmon, a faculty fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, argues against those who claim that the research university is an outmoded, bureaucratic institution ripe for disruption. Recounting the emergence of the research university in another era of media excess, this one driven by print, he focuses on what has always distinguished the research university—an ethics of knowledge. And this, he claims, is needed now more than ever. Here is an excerpt from the afterword of his book: Misgivings about specialized science and disciplinarity have returned in recent jeremiads about the research university from within its most elite ranks. Harvard professor Louis Menand writes that the “structure of disciplinarity that has arisen with the modern research university is expensive; it is philosophically weak; and it encourages intellectual predictability and social irrelevance. It deserves to be replaced.” Similarly, CUNY professor Cathy Davidson has criticized the research university as an “archaic, hierarchical, silo’d apparatus of the nineteenth century.” Our institutions of higher learning have “managed to change far more slowly than the modes of inventive, collaborative, participatory learning offered by the Internet” and other online and digital technologies. Unlike some of the more general critiques of the university’s disciplinary structure, however, Davidson’s critique is more focused on what is actually at stake. Our universities are “stuck,” she writes, “in an epistemological model of the past.” Our digital age entails not just new and better technologies but an entirely different notion of what constitutes true knowledge: how it is produced, authorized, and disseminated. The disciplinary organization of knowledge is antiquated and dispensable. The very structures and forms of knowledge are changing, and, for Davidson at least, the disciplinary research university is being left behind. In her more recent work on the future of education, Davidson embraces the potential of digital technologies to undo the authority structure of the research university and spur “collaborative” forms of knowledge production. And yet, in what she describes as a “field guide and survival manual for the digital age,” her Now You See It: How the Brain Science of Attention Will Change the Way We Live, Work, and Think, she relies on that same authority structure she seems eager to escape. She bases her “guide” for the digitally perplexed on what she calls “the science of attention.” She grounds her argument in the authority of modern, disciplinary-based science as she cites study after study, all of which are legitimated by the authority of the disciplinary order of the modern research university. Davidson’s bad faith is a testament to just how enduring a system the research university ethic is. But it has endured ***not*** because it was a rigid, hierarchical system, a Weberian iron cage, **a** Foucauldian **panopticon**, **but rather** because it has sustained communities of people engaged in a common pursuit. Research universities have never overcome the fragmentation of knowledge or realized anything like a universal knowledge. But what they have done is organize intellectual labor, traditions, and desires more effectively over the past two hundred years than any other technology. To dismiss the research university as an antiquated bureaucratic “apparatus” defined by constraint and enforceable standards is to overlook the ways in which its continuity and stability depended on the transformation of **actual people**…. **At this particular moment** of technological and institutional change, **we need motivating ideals to orient** our **institutions and ourselves**. The idea of the research university is more than its bureaucratic structures. However haltingly, the research university embodies ideals and virtues that scholars both inside and outside the university hold dear. This is where primarily structural accounts of the research university as simply a bureaucratic system, seemingly lacking human agents who endow it with meaning and life, **can offer no compelling** vision **(approach) for a future** research university. These cool, distant accounts of the research university, so redolent of Weber’s description of any other modern, rational system, see (observe) nothing at stake, just the inexorable logic of another modern bureaucracy. They (ignore) overlook the persons and norms that have always been the core of the research university. Anthony Grafton describes **this attitude** best: the “loss of patience, or faith, or interest in specialized knowledge” **is ultimately a capitulation to the absolute**ness of the **bureaucratic system** of the contemporary research university. Such an attitude belies a thoroughly structural account that omits the research university’s most basic feature: its underlying ethic. These more radically functional accounts, however descriptively illuminating, can never answer a basic question: why would anyone choose to devote herself (themselves) to specialized knowledge and an institution such as the research university? The research university reproduces itself by forming people into its culture. Its survival relies on the decisions of actual people, not simply on the abstract totalizing mechanisms of an institution. Advocates of the contemporary research university need to recognize and embrace its most central feature: the fact that it embodies a set of norms, practices, and virtues central to modern knowledge. Whatever its myriad failings and bureaucratic functions, the research university sustains what scholars hold in common and commit themselves to—an ethics of knowledge.

**1nc – extra**

**their argument traps them in the repetitive cycle of demanding the end of demands, in which they desire the uselessness of the activity in order to sustain their own ressentiment**

**John Cook 12**, at the time of publication a graduate student in Communications at Baylor University, former NDT first-round qualifier in 2012 for Baylor University, kdebate, 1(1), “Debating in the Hyperreal,” 6-9-12, http://web.archive.org/web/20160118095525/http://kdebate.com/cook.html

A more detailed study of Baudrillard's reflections on hyperreality would implicate Schnurer's description of hyperreality, showing it to be a rather **reductive understanding** and misinterpretation. Rather than functioning as a parallel dimension to a co-existing ‘true’ reality into which one may willfully escape temporarily to avoid engagement with a reality considered too unbearable to engage, the import of hyperreality is the total dissolution of any shared sense of this fundamental reality in the first place. As Mirzoeff notes: "…the real dissolves into a hyperreality, a culture in which Disneyland is not a distraction from reality, it is what is left of reality: 'it is a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself.’"[11] The total absorption of negativity and meaning by the sign has not lead to the condition of ultimate meaning and truth everywhere but the exact opposite – the creation of illusion at every possible site. In a text unanalyzed by Schnurer, Baudrillard himself critically points to this misinterpretation of the relation between reality, simulation, and illusion: “It is not, then the real which is the opposite of simulation — the real is merely a particular case of that simulation — but illusion…. And there is no crisis of reality. Far from it! There will always be more reality, because it is produced and reproduced by simulation, and is itself merely a model of simulation. The proliferation of reality, its spreading like an animal species whose natural predators have been eliminated, is our true catastrophe. … Over against the subject, that indomitable producer of meaning, stands the world, that inexhaustible producer of illusion, including, no doubt — with the involuntary complicity of the subject — the illusion of meaning. There will be no end to this frenzied race around the Mobius strip where the surface of meaning perpetually feeds into the surface of illusion. … The world as it is… perpetually eludes the investigation of meaning” [12] Schnurer’s posited distinction between hyperreality and a co-existing reality belongs strictly to the order of simulation, even as it produces the image of some reality. This is especially true given Schnurer’s call to “seek the highest level of (revolutionary) meaning”) which merely continues what Baudrillard characterizes as a ‘frenzied race around the Mobius strip’: the continual attempt to produce meaning and to graft those efforts onto the map of ‘reality’ (itself already reduced to pure simulation). Does this not correspond precisely to the common practice essential to competitive academic debate: the constant and continuous pursuit to produce the feeling or sense of ‘reality’ by means of an artificially-acceded-to sense of the world or a shift in perspective through argument to produce the intended persuasive effect? This insight also resonates with the research practices commonly employed in preparation for competitive academic debates. It would seem very much that the continued pursuit for the new counterplan, critique alternative, affirmative advantage, plan text, or other operative piece of solvent and ‘offensive’ (in the strategic sense) debate techne is this race around the Mobius strip described by Baudrillard, the pursuit of new productions of contingent realities fit for mass consumption (in this case, contingent validation through the reward of the ballot, taken as a performative gesture signifying the superiority of one team’s debating and/or argument over another’s). The continued impulse to produce new arguments which still adhere to familiar and reputable forms (the new negative strategy or affirmative plan and solvency claim) but which are unanticipated or unpredictable from the perspective of one’s opponent is evidence of the competitively born desire to created unpredictable content in predictable, communicable, and exchangeable forms. Furthermore, Schnurer's critique of the hyperreal as a dangerous distraction from a contemporary reality (with its **reliance on criticism by means of negative normative contraposition to an intrinsic goodness bestowed upon engagement with 'reality' as opposed to the falsity of the gaming model**) is **far less persuasive** in light of a more detailed engagement with Baudrillard's thoughts on hyperreality. Schnurer repeatedly attempts to criticize the hyperreality of simulation by means of contrasting the falsity of the gaming model to the truth of his revolutionary model of Potlatch. Baudrillard argues that **the order of simulation is not very susceptible to this critique**: "With the phase of simulation, equivalence is established through the sign: it is internal to the play of signifiers. Signifiers circulate without the possibility of dialectical negation (or critique) because the signifiers refer to each other rather to a 'real', or referent. A 'hyperreality' of simulations is far less susceptible to critique based, as it is, on contrasting the true and the false, the real and the unreal: 'signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real… they do so on condition that they are no longer exchanged against the real. … Neither Saussure nor Marx has any presentiment of this: they were still in the golden age of the dialectic of the sign and the real . . . the 'classical' period of capital and value. Their dialectic is in shreds. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 7)” [13] Schnurer’s simplistic model of the hyperreal as a parallel world distracting us from the true reality of the signified towards which one ought to strive compared to that negatively alluring sign does not come to terms with the method by which equivalence is achieved in the phase of simulation. Schnurer’s **repetitive dialectical contrasting of the ‘truth’ of the externally directed ‘revolutionary’ model of debate to the falsity of self-referential nature of the gaming model is not a strong dialectic in an age in which signs are ‘exchanged against each other rather than against the real’**. The tattered nature of this dialectic is exemplified by competitive debate’s sense of internally self-referential qualities: for example, when in topicality or theory debate, particular arguments are employed as examples of what is or is not considered permissible as well as its contingent, extrinsic (un)desirability expressed in a highly particularized vocabulary of “standards” coded spontaneously as positive or negative, consequent or irrelevant like ‘education’, ‘critical thinking’, ‘fairness’, ‘reciprocity’, ‘predictability’, etc.. These forms are not an abstract ‘hyperreal’ distraction from the issues being discussed but rather an engagement with those issues through the emptying of their pre-assigned meaning and their contingent recoding, subject to constant simulation through the production of reality by debaters who temporarily employ these empty signifiers to persuade their audiences. This also occurs at the level of form when the circulation of predictable forms of argument occurs in exchange for the ballot as a sort of intellectual referendum on the (contingent) veracity of certain arguments presented by the winning debater(s). **The empty sign of argument is exchanged in forms perceived to be successful argumentatively for yet another exchangeable but intrinsically meaningless sign of the ballot**. Schnurer’s **reductionist dialectic continually asserts that debate under the gaming model is in various ways not ‘real’**. As Baudrillard says, this dialectic ‘is in shreds’. Schnurer’s portrayal of the gaming model of debate as a hyperreal distraction from truer, ‘real’ activism is also flawed in that Schnurer is arguing in favor of a model of debate which produces highly visible challenges to power in the ephemeral sense: “How can a theory understand the desire of debaters to crack open the debate methods and introduce something “outside” of debate as Snider points to in his most recent gaming essay? The answer is that it can’t. Debate as a model can only create more debate, and so long as our goal for debate is more debate, then we will never emerge to challenge larger forces of control.” [14] Schnurer’s argument appears to be that one essential standard for models of debate is the requirement that they ought to pose a challenge to larger forces of control and that the gaming model fails because it constitutes a hyperreal fantasy which pulls debaters away from personal material realities which debaters ought to employ to become activists attempting to issue this challenge to larger forces of control. However, by imploring debaters to become visibly self-expressive (indirectly) towards the instrumental goal of “[challenging] larger forces of control”, Schnurer’s model of debate ensures that the debaters must constantly measure their performance and actions against some imagined idealized experience (as of yet not fully explained by Schnurer’s revolutionary model). In this way, Schnurer’s model **risks becoming an endless confessional where debaters merely repeat a single revolutionary agenda repetitively and unreflexively for the sake of experiencing debate as a form of self-expression to function in its totality as an instrumental challenge to power as opposed to competition through gaming. This becomes a circular exercise in compulsive self-expression aimed at creating symbolic exchange by rendering communication as pure value**: “Speaking, talking, endlessly communicating. This is **a form of violence** which targets the singular being and his secrecy. It is also a form of violence against language. In this mode of communicability, language loses its originality. Language simply becomes a medium, an operator of visibility. It has lost its symbolic and ironic qualities, those which make language more important than what it conveys. … The obvious goal of this kind of operation is to enslave the victims. But the victims are quite willing. They are rejoicing at the pain and the shame they suffer. Everybody must abide by society's fundamental logic: interactive exclusion. Interactive exclusion, what could be better! Let’s all agree on it and practice it with enthusiasm! If everything ends with visibility (which, similar to the concept of heat in the theory of energy, is the most degraded form of existence), the point is still to **make such a loss of symbolic space and such an extreme disenchantment with life an object of** contemplation, of sidereal observation (sidération), and of **perverse desire**.” [15] The danger of producing repetitive, personal activism as an exclusive mode of debate is explored somewhat in Snider’s response when he notes that “Schnurer ignores the realities that can emerge from what we do here on the ‘playing fields of earth.’”[16] Yet this argument is another strong articulation of the shared assumption of faith in the reality principle: that debate, as we have always known, is fundamentally ‘real’ in some unspecified way. While it may be the case that Schnurer’s faith in personal experience is flawed, Snider’s counter-argument only attempts to further prove debate is firmly in the realm of ‘truth’ (rather than simply dismissing Schnurer’s constructed dichotomy between ‘true’ revolutionary Potlatch and the hyperreal ‘world’ of debate as gaming). Schnurer’s vision of debate as a form of Potlatch which engages with the singular reality of lived experience rather than the immaterial falsity of hyperreal gaming repeats the gesture of closure for which he originally critiques Snider’s model. By repeatedly **contraposing the dangers of** this hyperreal model of **gaming to some assumed ‘true’ or ‘real’ engagement with ‘authentic’ experience**, Schnurer consistently **affirms the reality principle by asserting the intrinsic value of action directed towards a purpose either “external” to debate as contrasted to debate merely for its own sake or directed constantly ‘inwards’**. Even in the limited basis for Schnurer’s interpretation of hyperreality based exclusively on his reading of the portions of Simulation and Simulacra concerning Disneyland as noted earlier, there exists substantial implicit refutation of Schnurer’s affirmation of the reality principle when Baudrillard notes: “It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology) but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle.”[17] This selection indicates what Schnurer appears to have missed is that the condition of hyperreality **does not point to a false version of reality which one should challenge in favor of recovering a true sense of reality but rather that such an exercise of thought which attempts to re-assert the priority of ‘true’ ‘reality’, instead performs the integral role of concealing the absolute disappearance of reality and thus ‘saving the reality principle’**. It does so by means of the exact argumentative maneuver which Schnurer mistakenly performs; by responding to the phenomena of hyperreality by re-asserting some other, truer ‘reality’, Schnurer only further conceals the primary insight of observing the condition of hyperreality: the dissolution of the ‘real’. These (as well as the aforementioned) critical insights are entirely ignored by Schnurer’s portrayal of hyperreality as a distraction from some co-extent ‘reality’ and this misreading consequentially upends Schnurer’s attempt to evoke these concepts as a basis for argument against the gaming model.

## 2NC

### Frame subtraction

#### The link outweighs:

#### They clearly link: the 1AC references competition as a “fetish”. This word is loaded with 400 years of racist baggage---it is intimately tied with perspectives that denigrate African religions as irrational and subordinate to European ideas---their uncritical deployment of the term should be rejected

#### First is the morgan card (green)

Shahjahan & Morgan 2016 (Riyad A. Shahjahan, Department of Education Administration, Michigan State University, and Clara Morgan, Department of Political Science, UAE University. *Global competition, coloniality, and the geopolitics of knowledge in higher education*, British Journal of Sociology of Education, 37:1, 92-109) jte

Although scholars have critically examined how global **higher education** (HE) **is trapped in a competition fetish** (Cantwell and Kauppinen 2014; Hazelkorn 2009; King, Marginson, and Naidoo 2011; Portnoi, Rust, and Bagley 2010), the ways in which **global spaces of equivalence are tied to coloniality and competition** in HE remain largely unaddressed. By global spaces of equivalence, we wish to describe **socially constructed ‘commensurate spaces of comparison’** or ‘spaces of uniform measurement’ (Rizvi and Lingard 2010, 134) **that allow a large number of events to be recorded and summarized according to standard norms** (Desrosières 1998). **These spaces of equivalence are universalized, delocalized, and depoliticized so that they are seen as legitimate comparative measures**. Common global spaces of equivalence include global rankings (Times Higher Education or Shanghai Jia Tong) and/or educational indicators (e.g. OECD’s ‘Education at a Glance’).

The intensification of the struggle for positional advantage in the global economy, the enhanced global mobility of research and development, and the competition for highly skilled knowledge workers have contributed to fierce competition within and between national systems of HE (Naidoo 2014; Portnoi, Rust, and Bagley 2010). This **competition fetish is** also **characterized by ‘combined and uneven development’ among HE systems that are ‘stratified into elite high quality higher education and low quality mass produced education’** (Naidoo 2014, 4–5). Some have argued that we need to engage in a defetishing critique of HE measures, and suggest that we need to foreground the material conditions under which this competition has been produced (Naidoo 2014).

While this type of **HE competition has been characterized by performativity and market criteria** (Bagley and Portnoi 2014; Ball 1998, 2000), we reveal how **coloniality underpins the desire for global spaces of equivalence among participants in the global HE community**. The global competition debate has focused less on understanding the role that coloniality plays in constructing and sustaining the competition fetish (a recent exception is Ramírez 2014). We link concepts of coloniality, which include Fanon’s zones of being/non-being, with Mignolo’s geopolitics of knowledge. By coloniality, we mean the enduring logic of domination that ‘enforces control, domination, and exploitation disguised in the language of salvation, progress and being good for everyone’; this logic is largely enacted by dominant players on minoritized/peripheral groups (Mignolo 2005, 6). **Coloniality is about ‘long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations’** (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 243). The **competition fetish contributes to the construction of coloniality** **through the ‘modern magical belief** … **that competition will provide the god like solution to all the unsolved problems of higher education, that competition will protect us against risk and that competition will give us a better life’** (Naidoo 2014, 3).

We contribute to the global competition debate by analyzing how the competition fetish is constructed and shaped. We use the OECD’s International Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes (AHELO) initiative as a case study to highlight how coloniality is reproduced as part and parcel of this competition through the desires for a global space of equivalence. While a few scholars have critically examined the AHELO study (Ewell 2012; Shahjahan 2013; Shahjahan, Morgan, and Nguyen 2015; Shahjahan and Torres 2013), they have not yet addressed how AHELO as a global space of equivalence is tied to competitive logics. Even though AHELO has recently been shelved because of OECD members’ priorities (Jani Ursin, personal communication, 15 February 2014),1 it remains an important entry point to understanding the processes by which a new type of competition focused on teaching and learning is constructed, circulated, and internalized by various players in the transnational HE arena.

Our analysis shows how the competition logic manifests among various players in global HE (e.g. higher education institutions [HEIs], nation-states, and experts) by considering first how international organizations like the OECD work to develop spaces of equivalence across very different geographic, political, and psychosocial contexts, and how they become integral to reproducing a kind of competition that furthers economic interests. More specifically, we show how this **competition privileges and valorizes templates that derive from historically epistemically privileged positions** (i.e. globally competitive HE institutional models and discourse of learning outcomes). **These templates portray the characteristics exhibited by the enterprising, globally competitive institution** (Marginson and Considine 2000) **such as benchmarking and quality assurance practices, creating a globally competitive workforce, and producing credentialed mobile graduates to gain global status**. **Peripheral nations have to mimic the characteristics inscribed within the AHELO model**, **which in turn are based on powerful institutions in the most powerful nations, to enter the competition even if they have no chance of winning.**

We illuminate how the nature of **global competition is not simply tied to market-based economic or political rationalities, but also operates under psychosocial dimensions interlinked with belonging in the international community**. **This dimension**, we argue, which is often ignored by scholars and policy-makers, **is nevertheless an integral motor in the reproduction of coloniality**. **The seduction of achieving worthiness and belonging in the dominant strata of the global community becomes in itself a competition to leave the periphery and belong.** Drawing on the work of Fanon helps us understand why HEIs, nation-states, faculty, and students, particularly from zones that are marginalized, nevertheless willingly join this academic olympiad.

In this article, we first situate the theoretical approach we use to frame and analyze the competition fetish within AHELO. We next explain why the OECD’s AHELO is an apt case study. Drawing on texts and interviews with key informants from AHELO, we next highlight how **coloniality underpins the desire for global spaces of equivalences** in HE among various players, highlighting their dual desires for opportunity and for recognition. We argue that AHELO represents the mediation and internalization of a HE competition fetish, which reproduces coloniality in valuing the characteristics exhibited by the enterprising, globally competitive institution. We conclude by suggesting that a coloniality lens helps reveal the psychosocial and transhistorical colonial conditions that construct and perpetuate the competition fetish in HE.

Our theoretical approach to unveiling coloniality is decolonial thought. **A decolonial framework is an epistemic, ethical, political, and pedagogical project that involves the denaturalization of modern civilizational cosmology, and the inclusion of non-modern systems of knowledge and categories of thought** (Grosfoguel 2008; Mignolo 2011). Like other decolonial theorists, we presume that **coloniality and modernity are constitutive of each other: there is no modernity without coloniality. Decolonial thought ‘delinks’ itself from western and universalizing epistemologies by being ‘epistemically disobedient’** (Mignolo 2011, 209). We link Frantz Fanon’s zones of being and non-being with Walter Mignolo’s concept of geopolitics of knowledge to analyze how and why HE players come to desire a global space of equivalence. We illuminate how **global spaces of equivalence are integral to the reproduction of a certain type of competition.**

#### Second is Shapiro

**Shapiro 14** (Alan N Shapiro, senior lecturer at the Offenbach Art and Design University in Germany, Visiting Professor in Transdisciplinary Design at Folkwang University, visiting professor in the Department of Film and New Media at the NABA (Nuova Accademia di Belle Arti) University of Arts and Design in Milan, May 2014, “Jean Baudrillard and Albert Camus on the Simulacrum of Taking a Stance on War,” *International Journal of Baudrillard Studies* Volume 11 Number 2, modified) gz

*The Rebel* (*L’homme révolté* in French – better translated as *Man in Revolt*) was critical of the prevailing idea on the Left that the end of ‘revolutionary justice’ justifies the means of violence and/or murderous state power. It was about the question of the political and institutional justification of murder in modern society. Against the dominant ideologies of **corporate capitalism** and **self-righteous leftism**, Camus the hybrid anarchist-liberal explicates the principles of how to **fight and live**, and of how to **say both no and yes to the existing established order of society**, of the **authentic rebel**. Camus writes:

What is a rebel? ~~A man~~ [One] who says no, but whose refusal **does not imply a renunciation**. ~~He is~~ [They are] also ~~a man~~ [one] who says yes, from the moment ~~he makes his~~ [they make their] first gesture of rebellion. A slave who has taken orders all ~~his~~ [their] life suddenly decides that ~~he~~ [they] cannot obey some new command. What ~~does he~~ [do they] mean by saying ‘no’? ~~He means~~ [They mean], for example, that ‘this has been going on too long,’ ‘up to this point yes, beyond it no,’ ‘you are going too far,’ or, again, ‘there is a limit beyond which you shall not go’ (Camus 1956: 13).

This is an articulation of Camus’ very important idea of having “a sense of limits.” In his masterful 2004 book on the Sartre-Camus friendship and breakup, Ronald Aronson writes:

Fifty years later it [*The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*] still remains one of the most original and probing efforts to understand how the great modern impulse to freedom produced totalitarian societies…

[Camus] stressed that morality must remain at the center of politics, and was unremitting in his advocacy of free speech, democratic institutions, and civil rights in any movement for social justice…

Against the tendency of revolutionary philosophy **to act as if we can know and settle everything**, a **philosophy of revolt** “would be a **philosophy of limits**, of **calculated ignorance**, and of **risk**.” …

While rejecting what revolutions have become in the 20th century, these ideas certainly remain leftist at their core… Camus’ vision of **self-limiting revolt** is a prescient articulation of a **post-Marxist** and **postmodern radical politics** (Aronson 2004: 123-124, 266).

In the section of *The Rebel* called “Creation and Revolution” (at the end of Part Four, “Rebellion and Art”), Albert Camus sounds a lot like the Jean Baudrillard of *The Mirror of Production* (1975) (Marx’s views on work and play were not radical enough…) when he says: “**Capitalist society and revolutionary society are one and the same thing** to the extent that they **submit themselves to the same means** – industrial production… The society based on production is **only productive, not creative** (Camus 1956:272-273.” And Camus also sounds a lot like the young Karl Marx of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844* when he says: “Work, entirely subordinated to production, has ceased to be creative. Industrial society will open the way to a new civilization only by restoring to the worker the dignity of a creator (Camus: 1956: 273, Marx: 1976).”

Albert Camus and the Algerian War

Jean Baudrillard was born on July 27, 1929 in Reims, in the Champagne-Ardenne region of northeast France, near the Belgian border. Albert Camus was born on November 7, 1913 in Mondovi, Algeria, nowadays called Dréan, a small coastal town in the El Taref province, near the Tunisian border. Although he was highly critical of French colonial rule in Algeria, Camus found that he could not support the side of the revolutionaries during the Algerian War in the 1950s.

As a young man, Camus was sent by the Algiers-based daily newspaper *Alger républicain* to the northern region of Kabylie, which includes all or part of 9 Algerian provinces, to write journalistic accounts of conditions of poverty in the area. The result was a series of articles, “Misère de la Kabylie,” which are reprinted in the 1958 book *Chroniques algériennes*: 1939-1958 (*Actuelles III*), (Camus 2013).

In May 1945, Camus wrote a series of articles for the Parisian daily newspaper *Combat* (an important voice of the French Resistance during the Second World War of which Camus was editor-in-chief) about crisis, famine, justice, political malaise, and the ideas of the political party “Les Amis du Manifeste” in Algeria. These articles were also reprinted in the 1958 Éditions Gallimard book publication *Chroniques algériennes*. They first appeared in May 1945, at the time of the “Sétif massacre” (May 8th), when French military and police are said by historians to have killed as many as tens of thousands of Arabs in retaliation for attacks on French settlers by militant pro-independence demonstrators that killed about 100 French. Camus wrote sympathetically about “Les Amis du Manifeste,” the new political party which wanted citizenship rights for Algerian Arabs.

From July 1955 to February 1956, Camus wrote a series of articles for the Parisian weekly (and, at times, daily) news magazine/newspaper *L’Express*, advocating a “civilian truce” (*trêve pour les civils*) at a time of increased hostilities between Arabs and French in Algeria. These articles are also reprinted in *Chroniques algériennes*. On January 22, 1956, Camus was the main speaker at a meeting of twelve hundred people in Algiers, an audience equally divided beween Algerians and French, putting forward the program of the proposed civilian truce. An angry crowd of right-wing *pied noirs* gathered outside the meeting hall, shouting “Camus to the gallows.” In the “Appeal for a Civilian Truce in Algeria” (the text that accompanied this speech), Camus says:

What do we want? Simply to get the Arab movement and the French authorities, without having to make contact or to commit themselves to anything else, to declare simultaneously that for the duration of the fighting the civilian population will on every occasion be respected and protected… No cause justifies the death of the innocent… However black it may seem, the future of Algeria is not yet altogether sealed. If each individual, Arab or French, made an effort to think over his adversary’s motives, at least the basis of a fruitful discussion would be clear. But if the two Algerian populations, each accusing the other of having begun the quarrel, were to hurl themselves against each other in a sort of xenophobic madness, then any chance for understanding would be drowned in blood (Camus 1960: 134-135).

Faced with potential violence by the angry *pied noir* right-wing militants gathered outside the Cercle du Progrès meeting hall, the listeners to Camus’ speech quickly dispersed. Camus, of course, could subsequently do nothing to stop the escalation and intensification of the Algerian War. According to the Wikipedia article on the Algerian War, estimates of the number of civilians killed during the conflict range from 350,000 to 1.5 million people.4

Albert Memmi, an Arabic-speaking Jewish philosopher born in Tunisia, and the author of the book *The Colonizer and The Colonized*, developed the term “the colonizer of good will” to explain the political position of a thinker like Camus with respect to the major ‘decolonization’ war which occurred in Algeria (Memmi 1991). According to Memmi, “when the Arab Algerians started to demand their political freedom, [Camus] did not see that this was a national demand. He misunderstood the Algerian *national fact* (Rey 2006 : 108 ; citation from Albert Memmi, 1986). The “colonizer of good will,” although leftist and liberal in his politics, cannot truly support the struggle of the colonized because their cause threatens the continued existence of his own community [according to Memmi]. Memmi’s ‘revolutionary’ perspective on Camus’ discourse and actions surrounding Algeria has typified how many ‘leftist’ or ‘postcolonial’ commentators have thought about Camus’ position on the Algerian War (see for example O’Brian, 1970; Said, 1993). But it is not a correct or fruitful interpretation. In the contemporary post-2001 context of the **simulacral ‘War on Terror’**, and Baudrillard’s brilliant and cogent commentary on it, it is possible to make a **new reading of Camus** as a **thinker of the simulacrum of war**.

**War is presented to us as a Manichean choice**, as the battle of **‘good’ versus ‘evil’**. **You must choose**. **Camus refused to choose**. He was on the same wavelength as the first principle of a Baudrillardian theory of war.

Four aspects of a Baudrillardian theory of war. The post-structure of the (non-)war machine in the age of media virtuality has properties of binary/digital, simulation/modeling, viral metastasis, and complex intricate paradoxical topology. Camus was certainly on the same wavelength as two of these four ‘Baudrillardian’ principles: the binary/digital logic of the imposed binary choice, the simulacrum of a referendum. And the complex intricate paradoxical topology – Camus was the **philosopher *par excellence* of *the absurd***.

Camus in Stockholm

In 1957, Albert Camus was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. On December 11, 1957, the day after receiving and accepting the prize, Camus met with students at Stockholm University. Among the group was an Algerian student who confronted Camus with a set of tough critical questions about Algeria. After responding that he had always worked for “a just Algeria, where the two peoples should live in peace and equality,” Camus continued with this comment:

I have always condemned terror. I must also condemn a terrorism that is carried out blindly, in the streets of Algiers for example, and may one day strike my mother or my family. I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother before justice (Camus 1965: 1882; I have used the translation found in Aronson 2004: 211).

Camus’ ‘infamous’ comment – made while in Stockholm to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature at the height of the Algerian War – about choosing his mother before justice was an amazingly interesting and adroit intertextual reference to a famous anecdote told by Jean-Paul Sartre in his classic October 29, 1945 lecture “Existentialism is a Humanism”:

I will mention the case of one of my students, who sought me out under the following circumstances: his father had broken off with his mother and, moreover, was inclined to be a ‘collaborator’. His older brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940, and this young man, with primitive but noble feelings, wanted to avenge him. Her mother, living alone with him and deeply hurt by the partial betrayal of his father and the death of her oldest son, found her only comfort in him. At the time, the young man had the choice of going to England to join the Free French Forces – which would mean abandoning his mother – or remain by her side to help her go on with her life…(Sartre 2007: 30-31).

Sartre told the young man, his student, that he would **have to choose**, that he was **condemned to choose**, that he was ‘**condemned to be free’**, that this was the **situation of existence**, and that Sartre could not help him to make the choice.

In seeking me out, he knew what my answer would be, and there was only one answer I could give him: “You are free, so choose; in other words, invent. No general code of ethics call tell you what you ought to do; there are no signs in this world (Ibid.: 31).

By saying that he would choose his mother over justice, Camus was saying, in effect, and **contra Sartre**, that one can **choose to not to be forced to choose between apparently mutually exclusive alternatives**. Sartrean ethics seems to imply that one **must choose either A or B**. Camus’ position seems to be closer to that of a ‘deconstructionist psychoanalysis’. “I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother before justice.” Sometimes ‘I’ choose justice. Sometimes ‘I’ choose my mother. **‘I’ creatively navigate back and forth between the two**. It depends upon the circumstances of the moment and ‘I’ seek a balance.5 Through the **exercise of creativity** – the human capacity that will make us most human, according to Camus – one ‘takes matters into one’s own hands’ and **reclaims a genuine decision** coming from oneself, **saying simultaneously ‘yes’ and ‘no’** to both sides of **what appears to be the enforced choice** imposed on ‘me’ by ‘fate’ itself.

Camus in Uppsala

On December 14, 1957, three days after his encounter with the skeptical Algerian student at Stockholm University, Camus gave a lecture at Uppsala University, Sweden called “Create Dangerously.” In the transcript of this lecture, Camus writes about the virtualization of the economic sphere:

“For about a century we have been living in a society that is not even the society of money (gold can arouse carnal passions) but that of the **abstract symbols of money** (Camus 1960: 134).”

Compare this with what Jean Baudrillard writes in “Living Coin: Singularity of the Phantasm” in *Impossible Exchange* about money as the media of the universalization of meaninglessness:

“Money then becomes the universal transcription of a world **bereft of meaning**. This fetish money, around which global speculation revolves – far **above and beyond the reproduction of capital** – has nothing to do with wealth or the production of wealth. It expresses the **breakdown of meaning**, the impossibility of exchanging the world for its meaning…(Baudrillard 2001: 127-128).

What Baudrillard writes in these pages about the “the meaninglessness of the world” and the “demand for meaning” [in the “miracle of money”] echoes the most brilliant passages of *The Myth of Sisyphus* and provides a crucial bridge between the philosophy of absurdism and the literary sociology of the simulacra of modern culture.

Then Camus writes in “Create Dangerously” about semiotics and society:

“The society of merchants can be defined as a society in which **things disappear in favor of signs**. When a ruling class measures its fortunes, not by the acre of land or the ingot of gold, but by the **number of figures** corresponding ideally to a certain number of exchange operations, it thereby condemns itself to setting a certain kind of humbug at the center of its experience and its universe (Camus 1960: 253-254).”

Then come comments by Camus anticipating Reality TV and *The Truman Show*:

“What is there more real, for instance, in our universe than a man’s life, and how can we hope to preserve it better than in a realistic film? But under what conditions is such a film possible? Under purely imaginary conditions. We should have to presuppose, in fact, an ideal camera focused on the man day and night and constantly registering his every move. The very projection of such a film would last a lifetime and could be seen only by an audience of people willing to waste their lives in watching someone else’s life in great detail (Camus 1960: 258-259).”

Compare Jean Baudrillard writing in *Simulacra and Simulations* about the 1973 Public Broadcasting Station (PBS) Reality TV show “An American Family,” featuring the Loud family and the separation and subsequent divorce of Bill and Pat Loud:

“This family came apart during the shooting: a crisis flaired up, the Louds went their separate ways, etc. Whence that insoluble controversy: was TV responsible? What would have happened if TV hadn't been there… The producer's trump card was to say: ‘They lived as if we weren’t there.’ An absurd, paradoxical formula – neither true nor false: but utopian. The ‘as if we weren’t there’ is equivalent to ‘as if you were there’ (Baudrillard 1983: 49-50).”

During his lifetime, two of Jean Baudrillard’s deepest commitments were to **seduction** and to **aesthetics**. The ‘hyperreality’ of modern culture seeks to efface the difference between ‘reality’ and its representation. Simulation endeavors to eradicate the aesthetic dimension. **Seduction** is that which **encompasses**, **precedes**, and **exceeds** simulation. Seduction is the **difference between ‘reality’ and its representation**, or **between the ‘original’ and the ‘copy’** – that difference which **simulation seeks to suppress** in its attempt to represent or institute ‘reality’. Albert Camus was **also very concerned with seduction**, for example in the section in *The Myth of Sisyphus* on the literary figure of Don Juan. In “Create Dangerously,” Camus reflects deeply on the work of the artist, on **rebellion and ambiguity in art**, and on **creativity**. The primary responsibility of the artist is **not to take political stances**: **it is to create**.

#### the 2AC tactic of downplaying and reclarifying the significance of the term is an attempt at erasure that mirrors the ways Eurocentrism continues racial prejudice---that’s Brown. Their use was neither benign nor incidental---even subtle references reflect and extends centuries of racist thinking

Brown 3 – Karen McCarthy Brown, Professor of Anthropology of Religion at Drew University, “Making Wanga: Reality Constructions and the Magical Manipulation of Power”, in Transparency and Conspiracy, Ed. West and Sanders, p. 248

It seems that, whenever Haitians are in the news, a reference to Vodou can­not be far behind. In a zo June zoo° Village Voice article titled "Police Bru­tality and Voodoo Justice," Peter Noel, a black journalist whose byline ap­pears frequently in the Voice, wrote that "the father of Justin Volpe, the white cop who was accused of sodomizing Louima, . . . told friends he was warned by Haitian spiritual healers that Louima is a wicked voodoo high priest bent on deadly revenge." In the same article, Noel also reported that a cop improbably named Ridgway de Szigethy, who spends his time inves­tigating occult organizations, told Noel that, for his son's protection during the first trial, Robert Volpe carried "a little purple crystal ... and a little vial of holy water." By looking down his nose at crystals and holy water as well as Vodou wanga, Peter Noel exhibited a democratic disdain for all things religious, but, as a result, he missed the depth and significance of the racism in Robert Volpe's attempt to condemn Abner Louima through references to the African-based religion of his homeland. This is an old ploy and one with a long, continuous history. This maneuver is, in fact, a cornerstone in the his­toric and current structure of European and American racism. A look at the history of the term fetish, a word that is in most cases interchangeable with wanga, will give a glimpse into the depth and complexity of the racist tropes peppered throughout the coverage of Louima's encounter with the officers of New York's Seventieth Precinct.

**case**

**At the top, the Aff uses the phrase “Global South” multiple times. Sometimes it is ev – other times it was placed in a tag. Either way, the Affs criticism would be more potent if this rhetoric dimension were subtracted from the 1AC.**

The term Global South is written in to the tag Salem ‘20 ev.

In a 1AC rich in highlighting, it also appears in the Salem and Miola cards.

There’s no ev spin on the manner of deployment – our Toshkov ev is too strong on how deploying the term in the context of economic development convos is reifying and violent.

Though its strong, we do not even need to win OUR EV that this language creates negative realities.

Their own Salem ev concedes that tie when it says that:

power of the corporates is legitimized under the smart economics discourse.

#### Framing point – why include it ?.

Our 1NC Williams ev says the role of literary criticism should be to make Left Kritik more potent. The fact that our subtraction feels non-central to the 1AC is A STRENGTH our of position – not a flaw. It is precisely how Academic Review tends to function.

**Thus – for clarity – our Frames Alt subtracts the Aff’s seletive use of the phrase ‘Global South”.**

**The impact turns and outweigh the Aff – esp in light of the power of the cplan.**

**We turn the Aff – it re-creates violence and is borne from the very neoliberal principle in the 1AC. It pushes the same modes of determinism that the Aff otherwise seeks to break-from.**

**Toshkov ‘18**

Dimiter Toshkov - Associate Professor at the Institute of Public Administration at Leiden University in The Netherlands. Formerly, Jean Monnet fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence - “The ‘Global South’ is a terrible term. Don’t use it!” - November 6, 2018 - #E&F - http://re-design.dimiter.eu/?p=969

The "Global South"and "Global North"are inaccurate, misleading terms: There is no linear relationship between geographic latitude and human development.

(chart omitted)

You can say that we always knew that and the Global South was meant to refer to ‘distance from the equator’ rather than to absolute latitude. But, first, this is rather offensive to people in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and the southern part of South America. And, second, there is still far from a deterministic relationship between human development and geographic position, as measured by distance from the equator. The next plot (click on the image for a larger size, download a pdf version here) shows exactly that. Now, overall, the relationship is stronger: the correlation is 0.64. And after around the 10th degree, it is also rather linear, as indicated by the match between the linear regression line and the Loess fit. Still, there is important heterogeneity within the South/close to equator and North/far from equator countries. Singapore’ HDI is almost as high as that of Sweden, despite the two being on the opposite ends of the geographic scale. Ecuador’s HDI is just above Ukraine’s, although the former is more than 50 degree closer to the equator than then latter. Gabon’s HDI is higher than Moldova’s, despite Gabon being 46 degrees further south than Moldova.

**It also outweighs the Aff – our Alt and discourse card from the 1AC is especially strong. The term “shapes public discourses, homogenize diverse populations, and support narratives that take a life of their own, influencing politics and public policy”.**

**The essentialism alone boosts oppression and should be rejected. It’s still violent – even if it’s an attempt to “strategically essentialize”.**

**McLaurin ‘12**

(internally quoting Professional Philosopher Lawrence Blum, Distinguished Professor of Liberal Arts and Education and Professor of Philosophy @ UMass-Boston. Virginia A. McLaurin is a graduating MA student in the Department of Anthropology and Sociocultural Anthropology at Amherst. “Stereotypes of Contemporary Native American Indian Characters in Recent Popular Media” – Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS – May 2012 – http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1941&context=theses)

Philosopher Lawrence Blum, in writing on stereotypes as a general phenomenon, attempts a cohesive definition of stereotyping generalizable across a range of social interactions. “Stereotypes are false or misleading generalizations about groups held in a manner that renders them largely, though not entirely, immune to counterevidence… A stereotype associates a certain characteristic with the stereotyped group (Blum 2004: 251).” Blum goes on to provide additional characteristics inherent to the act of stereotyping, which can be synthesized into a basic definition for the act of stereotyping: he limits the stereotyped group to the domain of human beings, states that the group is of a particular salience (ethnicity, gender, religion, etc. or unique combination thereof), is portrayed as “fundamentally the same” (Blum 2004:261), and cannot be conceived of regularly otherwise. “Additionally,” summarizes one philosophy paper on Blum, “[the stereotyped group] has characteristic Y, where Y is a characteristic with a large graduation of moral significance (from bad stereotypes to the alleged good stereotypes), and Y is either false or misleading” (Suffis 2012: 4). Blum states that the characteristic (Y) may have a wide range on the moral scale of the stereotyping person or group, in order to account for the “bad” stereotypes as well as the “good” stereotypes. The removal of this passage can be argued on the basis that the Y characteristic need not register as morally significant to either group implicated in the stereotype. Features that are morally neutral to all persons involved in a stereotype can nevertheless constitute stereotypes. Any statement that envisions a group of people, grouped together based on culturally constructed race, region, age, or another salient feature as “fundamentally the same” robs them of their individuality and group diversity (Blum 2004:261). Blum argues that **as methods of dehumanization, these actions are inherently ethically problematic**. By this rationale, even when both groups involved in the stereotype (the stereotyper and the stereotyped) find nothing morally objectionable to the generalization being made, the kind of sweeping generalization of a group that acts to flattens difference and cannot allow for individuality becomes a stereotype, and in Blum’s estimation has a dehumanizing (and thus a negative effect) on the group being stereotyped. Alvin M. Josephy (1984:31) agrees, arguing that stereotypical images of Native people have “defamed and dehumanized Indians” by dent of their very existence.

**( ) Reject essentialism as an end onto itself. It is violent.**

**Chilisa ‘12**

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The last theme is how African and Asian feminists and other non-Western feminists aim to move gender research toward postcolonial and indigenous approaches and how they construct knowledge derived from the experiences of girls and women in their specific locations and histories. Non-Western feminisms call for the critique, decolonization, and indigenization of Euro-Western methodologies as well as the literature and theory about the Other. They propose and describe ways to read literature, employ theory, and conduct research while resisting all forms of patriarchal and imperial oppression (Duhc. 2000). They also urge scholars to 'find and highlight theory and theorizing In spaces perhaps not deemed theoretical from a Western academic perspective" (Saavcdra & Nymark. 2<x>8, p. 25K); to employ theoretical frameworks that are eclectic and combine theories and techniques from disparate disciplines and paradigms to construct their own paradigms (Sandoval, 2000): and 10 demonstrate "what indigenous cultures can offer in terms of concrete ways to read/re-read our current situations in the world" (Dillard 2008, p. 27H). Catherine Marshall and Michelle Young (2)106) argue that we must view gender research as a revolution and that methodology used 10 Investigate gender issues must involve "assertive question shifting, redefinition of issues, sharp attention to the power of dominant values, and vigilant monitoring of how questions are asked and how research is used-\* (p. 65). The aims of research in the context of postcolonial indigenous feminist frameworks are to: 1. Address "the complex matrix of power generated by a patriarchal, colonialist Kurocenirism that attempted to eliminate all remnants of cultures that were multifocal or egalitarian; or that represented a challenge to European male power" not usually addressed (Caitnella & Manuelito. 2008, p. -18). For instance, 111 Amadiume (1987). in her book. Male Daughters. Female Husbands, shows how patriarchal tendencies introduced by colonialism changed a somewhat flexible gender system that did not totally marginalize women into a more entrenched patriarchal system that Is still evident today. 2. Challenge the Western feminist construction of universal female experiences, replacing it with the recognition of "specifically situated women-located within varying complex systems of power. The argument is that Western feminisms have used Western women's experiences as the norm and basis for the construction, analysis, and evaluation of the Other non-Western women's experiences.This Othering of non-Western women has resulted in the creation of stereotypes and images that portray non-Western women as oppressed, uneducated, and passive. For instance, there is a tendency to portray Muslim women as oppressed and to use their veil-wearing as a measure of their oppression (Mohanty, 1991) or to use the practice of cliiorectomy in third World countries as a symbol of oppression. Consequently, it is argued that Western feminist theories impose their goals and aspirations on non-Western women and advocate for the eradication of all cultural practices that arc oppressive from the standpoint of Western culture. Postcolonial indigenous feminist research requires researchers to bring into the research framework issues of class, ethnicity, and agency of non-Western women and to recognize that the expressions and experiences of patriarchy vary from one context to another (Lunden. 201)6>. 3. Challenge researchers to identify with the colonized and historically oppressed peoples of the world and women and to design and adopt research methodologies that reject essentializing but instead engage in intersectional analyses of all forms of erasure, domination, and exclusion. Collins s (2000) matrix of domination is an example of methodologies that engage in intersectional analyses of all forms domination and exclusion.

## 1NR

**Wanna play a Game?**

**Game-playing DA –**

**1. We should not seek meaning nor should we move towards a legitimate engagement with alterity. Rather, debate should be as a ritual dramaturgy wherein we submit absolutely and totally submit to the rules of the game as a transgression of the law. The only impact to game playing is the ability to lose oneself in total submission to the rules.**

**Baudrillard 79** Jean, Seduction, pg. 131-3

The Diary of the Seducer claims that in seduction the subject is never the master of his master plan, and even when the latter is deployed in full consciousness, it still submits to the rules of a game that goes beyond it . A ritual dramaturgy beyond the law, seduction is both game and fate, and as such pushes the protagonists towards their inevitable end without the rule being broken - for it is the rule that binds them. And the rule's basic dictum is that the game continue whatever the cost, be it death itself. There is, then, a sort of passion that binds the players to the rule that ties them together - without which the game would not be possible. Ordinarily we live within the realm of the Law, even when fantasizing its abolition. Beyond the law we see only its transgression or the lifting of a prohibition. For the discourse of law and interdiction determines the inverse discourse of transgression and liberation. **However, it is not the absence of the law that is opposed to the law, but the Rule.** The Rule plays on an immanent sequence of arbitrary signs, while the Law is based on a transcendent sequence of necessary signs. The one concerns cycles, **the recurrence of conventional procedures**, while the other is an instance based in an irreversible continuity. The one involves obligations, the other constraints and prohibitions. Because the Law establishes a line, it can and must be transgressed. By contrast, it makes no sense to "transgress" a game's rules; within a cycle's recurrence, there is no line one can jump (instead, one simply leaves the game). Because the Law - whether that of the signifier, castration, or a social interdiction - claims to be the discursive sign of a legal instance and hidden truth, it results in repression and prohibitions, and thus the division into a manifest and a latent discourse. Given that the rule is conventional and arbitrary, and has no hidden truth, it knows neither repression nor the distinction between the manifest and the latent. It does not carry any meaning, it does not lead anywhere; by contrast, the Law has a determinate finality. The endless, reversible cycle of the Rule is opposed to the linear, finalized. progression of the Law. **Signs do not have the same status in the one as in the other.** The Law is part of the world of representation, and is therefore subject to interpretation or decipherment. It involves decrees or statements, and is not indifferent to the subject. It is a text, and falls under the influence of meaning and referentiality. By contrast, the Rule has no subject, and the form of its utterance is of little consequence; one does not decipher the rules, nor derive pleasure from their comprehension - **only their observance matters,** and the resulting giddiness. This also distinguishes the passion for the game's rituals and intensity from the pleasure that attaches to obedience to the Law, or its transgression. In order to understand the intensity of ritual forms, one must rid oneself of the idea that all happiness derives from nature, and all pleasure from the satisfaction of a desire. On the contrary, games, the sphere of play, reveal a passion for rules, a giddiness born of rules, and a force that comes from ceremony, and not desire. Does the delight one experiences in a game come from a dream-like situation, where one moves free of reality, but which one can quit at any time? Not at all. Games, unlike dreams, are subject to rules, and one just doesn't leave a game. Games create obligations like those found in challenges. To leave a game is unsportsmanlike. And the fact that one cannot refuse to play a game from within - a fact that explains its enchantment and differentiates it from "reality" - creates a symbolic pact which compels one to observe the rules without reserve, and to pursue the game to the end, as one pursues a challenge to the end. The order instituted by the game, being conventional, is incommensurable with the necessary order of the real world: it is neither ethical nor psychological, and its acceptance (the acceptance of the rules) implies neither resignation nor constraint. As such, there is no freedom in our moral and individual sense of that term, in games. They are not to be equated with liberty. Games do not obey the dialectic of free will, that hypothetical dialectic of the sphere of the real and the law. To enter into a game is to enter a system of ritual obligations. Its intensity derives from its initiatory form - not from our liberty, as we would like to believe, following an ideology that sees only a single, "natural" source of happiness and pleasure. The game's sole principle, though it is never posed as universal, is that by choosing the rule one is delivered from the law. Without a psychological or metaphysical foundation, the rule has no grounding in belief. One neither believes nor disbelieves a rule - one observes it. The diffuse sphere of belief, the need for credibility that encompasses the real, is dissolved in the game. Hence their immorality : to proceed without believing in it, to sanction a direct fascination with conventional signs and groundless rules.

**2. Their attempt at transgression of the rules of debate is the ultimate conformity. Not only is this a very clear reason to vote negative on presumption, they reify the rules of debate, which turns the case.**

**Baudrillard 79** Jean Baudrillard, Seduction, pg. 140-1

If games had a finality, the only true player would be the cheater. Now, if a certain amount of prestige can be acquired by transgressing the law, there is no prestige in cheating or transgressing a rule. In truth, the cheater cannot transgress the rules since the game, not being a system of interdictions, does not have lines one can cross. One does not "trangress" a rule, one fails to observe it . And non-observance does not lead to a state of transgression ; it brings one back under the jurisdiction of the law. This is the case with the cheater, who denies or, even better, profanes the game's ceremonial conventions for economic reasons (or psychological reasons, if he cheats simply for the pleasure of winning), and thereby restores the laws of the real world. **By introducing factors of an individual nature, he destroys the game's "duel" enchantment .** If cheating was once punished by death and is still condemned strongly, it is because, as a crime, it resembles incest : cultural rules being broken to the sole profit of the "laws of nature." For the cheater, there is no longer anything at stake. He confuses the stakes with surplus-value. But the stakes are what enables one to play, and to turn them into the game's purpose is to abuse one's position of trust. In a similar manner, **the rules establish the very possibility of playing, the space within which the sides confront each other.** To treat the rules as ends (or as laws or truths) is to destroy both the game and its stakes. The rules have no autonomy, that quality which, according to Marx, characterizes commodities, both individually and in general, and is the sacrosanct value of the economic domain. The cheater too is autonomous: he establishes a law, his own law, against the arbitrary rituals of the rule - this is what disqualifies him. And he is free -this explains his downfall . Moreover, he is rather dreary, because he no longer exposes himself to the seduction of games, because he refuses the vertigo of seduction. By way of hypothesis, one might postulate that personal advantage is only an alibi: in reality he cheats in order to escape seduction ; he cheats because he is afraid of being seduced.